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Abstract—A distributed Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) consists
of tightly integrated computing, communication and control
technologies. Recent CPS hacking incidents had significant conse-
quences. In such a context, reinforcing their resilience, referring
to their capacity to recover from disruptions, is a key challenge.
Concretely, it involves the integration of mechanisms to regulate
safety, security and recovery from adverse events, including
plans deployed before, during and after incidents occur. We
envision a paradigm change where an increase of adversarial
resources does not translate anymore into higher likelihood of
disruptions. Consistently with current system design practices in
other areas, employing high safety technologies and protocols, we
outline a vision for next generation CPS addressing the resilience
challenge leveraging ideas such machine learning, fuzzy decision
and quantum computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
C
Yber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate computation,
communication and physical processes [45]. The design
of a CPS involves several fields including computer science,
control theory, automation, networking and distributed sys-
tems. Skills from these domains are put together to ensure
that a myriad of computing resources and physical elements
get orchestrated via networking technologies. In addition, CPS
integrate facilities for human-computer interaction. Examples
of CPS interacting with humans include industrial control
systems (e.g., workers operating industrial machines) and
smart cities (involving thousands of nodes and citizens).
CPS are omnipresent in our everyday life. Hacking and
failures of such systems have impact on critical services with
potentially significant and lasting consequences. Reinforcing
their resilience is a key challenge. Resilience refers to the
capacity of a system to recover from disruptions. It can be seen
as the mechanisms present in a system to regulate its safety
and security and to recover from adverse events. Resilience
includes actions and plans that are deployed before, during and
after adverse events take place. Resilience is a historical term
used as a descriptor in complex fields, from psychology and
medicine to civil and military engineering. In cybersecurity,
it relates to the idea of how a complex system bounces back
from a disruption, as well as all the possible post-disruption
strategies followed after the events are recognized.
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A. Related Work
The state of the art in CPS security has recently been
reviewed by Girlado et al. [28] and Humayed et al. [37].
According to Giraldo et al., past research works have put much
emphasis on the problem of preventing perpetration of attacks
on CPS, for instance, leveraging cryptographic techniques and
building intrusion detection systems. They emphasize the need
for more works on techniques for mitigating the consequences
of attacks. After they have been detected, the problem of
responding to attacks seems to have received little attention.
Humayed et al. did a good job at identifying representative
CPS and reviewing security issues specific to them. The
categories are industrial control systems, medical devices,
smart cars and smart grid systems. For every representative
CPS, specific threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and controls are
examined.
Although the term CPS emerged recently1, it builds upon
very well-established research fields, i.e., embedded com-
puting, control theory and human-computer interaction. For
instance, a CPS can be easily modelled as a Networked-
Control System (NCS) [24]. The major difference is that the
controller is coupled with the actuators and sensors through a
communication network (e.g, an Ethernet-like network). The
use of this communication network to connect the compo-
nents provides flexibility and low implementation costs [31].
NCS classical theoretical problems include (1) stabilization of
system processes given delays and packet losses due to the
network elements [72], [78]; (2) data rate limiting techniques
(e.g., control to systems traffic) [35] and (3) energy efficiency
for wireless NCS [4], [69]. It is only until recently that the
NCS communities started working on cybersecurity issues
of CPS [45], [73]. Obviously, the use of a communication
network to transport control and observations, i.e., signals
to actuators and from sensors, paves the way to important
security vulnerabilities [65]. A NCS can be attacked and needs
to be protected.
Attacks exploiting NCS vulnerabilities can be characterized
according to three main aspects [67]: (a) adversary’s a priori
knowledge about the system and its protective measures,
(b) class of disrupted resources (e.g., denial-of-service at-
tacks targeting elements that are crucial to operation) and
(c) analysis of control signals during perpetration of an attack
(e.g., sensor outputs), that may be used to carry out more
sophisticated attacks (e.g., attacks targeting the integrity or
availability of the system). The knowledge of adversaries in
terms of, e.g., system dynamics, feedback predictability and
1Coined by H. Gill at the National Science Foundation in 2006, according
to [66].
TABLE I
REPRESENTATIVE CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS REPORTED IN THE MEDIA.
1. Sabotage of critical facilities, such as a German steel mill in
2015, hospitals, media and financial services in France and the UK
in 2017 and 2018. The problem is spanning several countries from
the European Union, the US, and beyond.
1. Human adversarial actions in this scenario, include USB
injection of corrupted software binaries, drive-by-download malware
installation, spear phishing-based design of websites, and traditional
social engineering manipulation of critical infrastructure employees.
2. Remote control of navigation systems, including successful
hacking of autonomous cars and avionic systems. Studies and general
concern started with a malware that infected over sixty thousand
computers of a Iranian nuclear facility, and destroyed more than
one thousand nuclear centrifuges. This delayed the Iran’s atomic
program by at least two years.
2. Human adversarial actions include the use of infection
vectors (e.g., USB drives), corrupted updates and patches, radio
frequency jamming, radio frequency spoofing, and software binary
manipulations.
3. Disruptions of large-scale industries have been appointed by
the Federal Office for Information Security of Germany as a serious
concern to European factory and industrial markets. Similar threats
affect drones and smart cities, as well.
3. Human adversarial actions include the use of GNSS (Global
Navigation Satellite Systems) attacks, such as jamming and spoofing
of signals, and hijacking of communications to downgrade commu-
nications to insecure modes (e.g., downgrading from encrypted to
plain-text communications).
system countermeasures, can be used to perpetrate attacks with
severe security and safety implications, when they target the
operations of, e.g., industrial systems and national infrastruc-
tures. They can lead to catastrophic consequences to busi-
nesses, governments and society at large. A growing number
of attacks on cyber-physical infrastructures are reported in
the world, targeting vital activities (e.g., water, energy and
transportation) for intelligence or sabotage purposes. Some
representative incidents are outlined in Table I.
A careful review of incidents as those in Table I reveals
that they all have a common element [38], [57]: human
adversarial actions forging system feedback measurements
for disruption purposes [27]. The underlying issue, hereinafter
called the feedback truthfulness problem, refers to intentional
situations perpetrated by human adversaries, forging physical
observations in a stealthy manner [6], [39]. They are cyber-
physical attacks generating anomalies [32], [65]. However,
even if detected, the attacks appear as unintentional errors.
Hence, they are leading to wrong resilience plans. How to
distinguish an intentional attack from an unintentional fault?
This a challenge because symptoms may almost be the same,
but reactions should be different. Indeed, the correct response
to a fault is a repair action that restores the state of the system.
In case of an intentional attack, physical resources may not be
faulty at all, but the adversary makes them appear faulty. A
repair action will not help.
It is crucial to address the aforementioned challenge in
a provable manner in order to prioritize appropriate re-
sponses and rapidly recover control to assure cyber-physical
resilience [26], [38], [44]. That is, to assure the persis-
tence of the system when facing changes, either accidental
or intentional [70]. In terms of CPS design, cyber-physical
resilience shall also deal with the management of operational
functionality that is crucial for a system, and that cannot be
stopped. In other words, system functionality that shall be
properly accomplished. Regarding the incidents mentioned in
Table I, the cooling service of reactor in a nuclear plant,
or the safety controls of an autonomous navigation system,
are proper examples of critical functionalities. Other system
functionalities may be seen as less important; and even be
temporarily stopped or partially completed. Such type of
functions can be seen as secondary. A printing service for
employees in a nuclear plant scenario is a proper example of
a secondary function that one might accept to sacrifice, under
graceful degradation.
When addressing resilience, two crucial elements to take
into consideration are the severity of the actions disrupting
the functionalities of a system and properly distinguishing
accidental failures from intentional attacks [15], [39], [47],
[60], [77]. The objective is to use the proper security stacks
and deploy resilience plans, including responses that mitigate
the impact of undesirable actions [26]. This includes the use of
proactive, often short-term, tactical policies to handle failures;
and reactive, usually long-term, strategies for attacks [36],
[55], [58]. Security stacks in both areas can include redun-
dancy (e.g., use of additional system replicas), compartamen-
talization, segmentation, and activation of upgraded modes
of protection (e.g., use of cryptography to enable secure
handshakes, message signatures, and encryption[28], [37]).
The inclusion of resilience plans shall always keep critical
processes in a normal operating mode, while the system is
confronted with incidents. The challenge of satisfying those
requirements on automated CPS designs stresses the impor-
tance of determining the root nature of incidents, to drive
the appropriate models (e.g., in terms of remediation) that the
system must select and enforce in the end.
One may also consider that both accidental failures and
intentional attacks can be formally represented as anomalies
in the measured data. Recent studies by Iturbe-Urretxa et
al. [39], [40] discuss on the feasibility of distinguishing
between process disturbances and intrusions in process control
systems using multivariate statistical process control. More
specifically, the authors define a statistical analysis process
for the definition of normal traffic, reporting anomalies (i.e.,
deviations from the expected profile of a trustworthy entity) as
adversarial activities. Authors show the way of dealing with
the complexity of data management as a result of monitoring
processes collecting and transforming anomalous events in
industrial control systems mathematically modeled as NCS.
The contributions of the study range from visual analytics
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to detection and correlation of anomalous events based on
statistical management of large datasets.
More relevant related works and reference material are cited
throughout the remaining sections of the paper. Section II
provides a more thorough introduction to the concept of re-
silience and the use of security stacks to enable cyber-physical
protection. Section III argues the necessity of a paradigm
change and discusses our vision of how next generation
resilient CPS will be addressing such a change. Sections IV
and V explore some promising techniques inline with our
proposal, and how to benchmark and dimension them.
II. RESILIENCE AND SECURITY STACKS
Resilience is a term with centuries of use [51]. It encom-
passes multidisciplinary fields, from psychology and medicine
to civil and military engineering. Current application of the
term under the scope of cybersecurity is centered upon the idea
of bouncing back from failures, while defending forward from
attacks. It emphasizes the capacity of a system to recover from
disruptions, and is often seen as the underlying technique by
which a system regulates its safety and security mechanisms,
to recover from adverse events. Resilience includes actions and
plans that must be conducted before, during, and after events
take place. Resilience is a historical term used as a descriptor
in complex fields, from psychology and medicine to civil and
military engineering. The modern application of resilience
relates to the idea of how a complex system bounces back
from a disruption, as well as all the possible post-disruption
strategies that may come after the events are identified.
Under the scope of complex systems theory, the concept
of resilience may be confused with other traditional con-
cepts such as robustness, fault tolerance and sustainability.
However, there exist fundamental differences between such
terms. For instance, while robustness stands for the ability
to withstand or overcome adverse conditions (e.g., faults and
attacks), resilience refers more to the capacity for a system to
maintain functionality despite the occurrence of some internal
or external disruptions, e.g., adversarial breach [9]. Similarly,
fault tolerance refers more to the maintenance of crucial
services within a given time-period under the presence of
failures and sustainability to similar metaphors in disciplines
like environmental and socio-ecological processes [1], [30].
Laprie [50] settled some key definitions when comparing
resilience to dependability and fault tolerance. In his work, La-
prie related the resilience and dependability terms as follows:
Resilience is the persistence of dependability when facing
changes. More recently, the relation between resilience and
performance targets have been described by Meyer [53] as
follows: Resilience is the persistence of Performability when
facing changes. This can be accomplished by graceful degra-
dation, i.e., by prioritizing some services over non-essential
ones, for as long as possible [29].
The concept of resilience spans across several other disci-
plines. For instance, when talking about resilience in terms
of network theory, resilience refers to the persistence of
service delivery when the network faces changes [76]. In
terms of quality of service, resilience relates to the degree
of stability of the services provided by the system [7]. From a
control-theoretic standpoint, resilience refers to the ability to
reduce the magnitude and duration of deviations from optimal
performance levels [57]. Finally, resilience is also seen in
disciplines such as medicine and psychology, as the ability
to recover from a crucial trauma or crisis [75]. The common
element seen in all the aforementioned definitions relates to
adaptation to confront change and significant adversities.
When we move to the specific context of cybersecurity,
resilience means accepting that the system is vulnerable to
attacks, in addition to faults and failures [36], [6]. It means to
accept that there will be breach of security (e.g., by a collu-
sion between insiders and outsiders, attacking and disrupting
the system). Handling resilience in the cybersecurity context
means holding an adversarial mindset and getting ready to
lose some assets [29]. This does not mean sacrificing the
system, but deciding which parts of the system we can lose
(accepting that we must lose some control over the system)
while prioritizing those assets we must give up to assure that
the system will remain functional during the disruptions.
To improve resilience from the cybersecurity standpoint
relies on enforcing a traditional security stack, in terms of
identifying the system weaknesses (e.g., in their software and
infrastructure themselves) that could potentially be controlled
by a skilled adversary with the purpose of disrupting the sys-
tem. Management in terms of identifying vulnerabilities must
be followed as well by assessment of incidents, service con-
tinuity and, in general, any risks affecting the system. These
aforementioned management perspectives must be driven by
resilience thinking in the form of bouncing back (or defending
back) from disruptive or adverse events. In other words, attacks
against the availability of a given service, as well as any
incident leading to security breaches must be quickly solved
(e.g., incidents must properly be absorbed). Representative
examples of security stacks are presented next.
A. TRADITIONAL CYBERSECURITY STACKS
Traditional cybersecurity literature associated to the resilience
of a CPS includes the use of technological barriers designed
to prevent unauthorized communications between the elements
of the CPS and the outside world. This includes the use of fire-
walls [13], cryptography [43], intrusion detection systems [42]
and security information and event management (SIEMs) [48].
Beyond these traditional solutions, we can also encounter
related cybersecurity literature to ensure attack tolerance [3].
Attack tolerance is an extended in-depth strategy proposed
to defend a system against any particular attack using several
independent methods [49]. Several proposed security solutions
for CPS focus in detection and attack prevention. However,
preventing every single possible attack is hard to achieve. De-
spite the efforts, attacks can happen and be successful. Attack
tolerance is the capability of a system to continue functioning
properly with minimal degradation of performance, despite the
presence of attacks. Some representative techniques proposed
in the literature to achieve attack tolerance follow.
Redundancy and diversity are often combined together to
ensure protection beyond breach [42], [41]. Redundancy as-
sumes the use of extra reserved resources allocated to a system
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TABLE II
SAMPLE LIST OF CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS REPORTED IN RECENT CPS SECURITY LITERATURE.
Attack Technique Description
Replay of cyber-physical control data [54] Adversaries replay previous measurements (corresponding to normal
operation conditions) and control inputs, to disrupt the system.
Dynamic false-data injection [57] Adversaries drive the system to unstable states, by using system
vulnerabilities.
Bias-data injection, using system identification
techniques [68]
Adversaries disrupt the behavior of the system, by injecting faulty
data constructed to evade feedback-control detectors.
Covert and Stealthy [65] Adversaries hold complete knowledge about the system dynamics,
to impersonate the feedback controller and evade fault detection.
Zero Dynamics [12] Adversaries make unobservable an unstable state of the system using
controller vulnerabilities.
TABLE III
SAMPLE LIST OF ENHANCED DETECTION TECHNIQUES REPORTED IN RECENT CPS SECURITY LITERATURE.
Security Technique Description
Linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control using
authentication challenge-response signals [54]
Watermarking injection of noise in the system that, under normal
operation, must be reflected in the outputs, withoiut modifying the
system,.
Signal-based correlation and Cross-layer iden-
tification [57]
Signal-based correlation using statistical properties of system dy-
namics, combining control-theoretic and adaptive security.
Auxiliary Systems and Digital Twins [61] Use of auxiliary states, outputs and (optionally) inputs, evolving in
parallel with the CPS, to identify the attacks.
that are beyond its need in normal working conditions. If the
system finds that the output values of a primary component are
not correct, then the responsibility is transferred to one of the
redundant components. Diversity means that a function should
be implemented in multiple ways, differently at different times.
For example, research has made it practical to automatically
generate diverse functionality from the same source code or
automatically change the configuration of a system from time
to time to confuse the adversary.
Dynamic reconfiguration takes place after the detection of
an attack. In traditional systems, reconfiguration is mostly
reactive and generally performed manually by the adminis-
trator. Thus, it involves some downtime. Survivable systems
need an adaptive reconfiguration to be proactive, instead.
Reconfiguration under the context of decentralization can be
achieved by dividing trust into separated shares. Decentralized
strategies can be used to assure that the system needs to reach
a given threshold prior granting authorization measures [10].
Below the threshold, information gets concealed to the eyes
of the adversary. Reaching a threshold allows reconfiguration
to a state that ensures the correct provision of the required
functions.
B. CONTROL-THEORETIC EVOLUTIONS
From a control-theoretic point of view, the secure operation of
a CPS requires the maintenance of three properties: observ-
abilty, controllability and stability. Observability means that
the controller must always be able to accurately estimate the
state of the system. Controllability implies that the controller
is all the time able to act upon the system. Stability is
preserved when the controller manages to keep the system
at or near the desired operating point. Cyber-physical attacks
compromise observability, controllability and stability of a
CPS. The adversary aim is to be invisible while attacks are
being perpetrated. How to detect adversarial activities and
mitigate their impact?
Tables II and III list, non-exhaustively, attack and detection
techniques in control-theoretic literature for CPS. Control-
theoretic literature represent as occasional disturbances the
collateral damages resulting from attacks against a CPS.
Mitigating the attack and its impact with the deployment of
an appropriate resilience plan, may allow the CPS to con-
tinue offering the service under a graceful degradation mode.
Mislabeling the attack and correcting it with unappropriated
response would lead again to the series of incidents such as
those contained in Table I, due to the application of wrong
countermeasures.
The literature listed in Tables II and III also assumes
powerful adversarial models. They suppose that an adversary
can observe and change signals generated by sensors or signals
provided to actuators. I.e., the adversary can operate with the
information going through the network. The adversary may
also know or learn the model of the system, e.g., using system
identification tools. The adversary also can manipulate sensor
measurements, to make the state change invisible, i.e., to evade
detection.
III. FUTURISTIC CYBER-PHYSICAL RESILIENCE
In the previous section, the meaning of resilience has been
contrasted with related concepts such as dependability and
fault tolerance, in the context of cybersecurity. We exam-
ined the relation between resilience and classical solutions
implemented in today’s security stacks, including in-depth
defense (e.g., firewalls and cryptography) and control-theoretic
protection techniques. These approaches aim to prevent system
breaches from happening. However, the scenarios cited in
Table I are evidence that we must assume that security
breaches will continue to occur in CPS. Solutions must be
designed to defend the system beyond security breaches.
We argue that new security stacks must be included in to-
morrow’s resilient CPS to manage the occurrence of breaches.
New stacks must manage and take control over adversarial
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actions that will persistently occur in the future, such as the
ones listed in Table I. The new stacks must be built taking on
the adversary mindset, predicting its intentions and adequately
mitigating the effects. For example, a CPS can be equipped
with new learning capabilities that anticipate the adversary
intentions and transform them into regular actions. These
potential new stacks, hereinafter called the defense learning
stack, will enable the evolution towards CPS that are resilient
beyond breach. The management of feedback truthfulness (cf.
Section I) is a typical example of the class of problems in the
scope of a defense learning stack.
The defense learning approach must achieve profiling of
control data to ensure that misbehaving CPS components can
be detected and thwarted; as well as assessing the trustwor-
thiness of all the exchanged information. Adversarial actions
are signaled and the new defensive components start learning
about the target (e.g., the source adversary). The goal is
to discover the weaknesses of the adversary, to offensively
mislead the adversary intentions and thwart the adversarial
actions in the end. Once the new defense learning stack gets to
know the adversary (i.e., the techniques used by the adversary
to identify the system, discover services, disrupt the services,
etc.) the defender starts offering to the adversary some assets
(i.e., assets assumed as collateral damages, that need to be
sacrificed to manage the breach) to gain the trust of the
adversary, i.e., to make the adversary confident about the
success of the perpetrated actions. In the sequel, an illustrative
example is provided.
Illustrative Example. The availability of futuristic automated
design technologies for resilient CPS is assumed, i.e., by
including continuous dynamics and discrete event compo-
nents [46]. The continuous dynamics of a CPS, shall be mod-
elled by differential equations. Threat modeling, representing
malfunctioning, faulty entry points, and powers of adversaries
must be included in the design phases, via the incorporation
of the security stacks mentioned in Section II (e.g., traditional
cybersecurity stack solutions discussed in Section II-A and
its control-theoretic evolution outlined in Section II-B), as
well as the extended defense learning stack. Controllers must
guarantee the correctness of observations and measurements
to identify and mitigate system malfunctioning as well as
intentional (human) attacks. It also provides the necessary
mechanism for the defender components to conduct a profiling
of adversarial actions, in order to thwart the attacks, i.e.,
synthesizing new CPS resilient designs in which adversaries
do not lead the security game anymore.
This will radically change from current scenarios (e.g.,
attacking advantages with regard to resources), to the novel
defense learning paradigm. The series of physical and ad-
versarial laws provided in the CPS design, guide the ratio-
nale that controllers actions (e.g., acceleration and braking
actions commanded to each train) satisfying the verification of
networked-feedback observations to identify traces of system
malfunctioning and intentional manipulation from networked-
feedback observations. Controllers aim at guaranteeing col-
lision avoidance. Adversaries aim at forcing collisions in a
stealthy manner (i.e., taking control with minimal perturbation
w.r.t. observations, to evade detection). A covert attack (cf.
Table II) may be perpetrated. The adversary exploits the
possibility of having a nonzero state trajectory, by conducting
a covert misappropriation of the system via the adversarial
entry points, and silently exciting the system to a perturbed
state trajectory which, if detected, will be mitigated with mal-
functioning correction, instead of an operational resilience plan
to remediate the attack. The need to distinguish attacks and
malfunctioning should be addressed carefully — a problem
receiving very little attention in the literature.
The exemplified design steps do not give the specific
details about the integration the resilience mechanisms, nor
the protection capabilities of the system against threats and
adversaries. Further information about potential techniques
to enable the defense learning approach, as well as real-
life systems for the benchmarking and dimensioning of such
techniques, are provided in the following two sections.
IV. MOVING FORWARD
In the previous section, we argued that modern CPS must
change today’s adversarial paradigm where an increase in
the resources of the adversaries always translates into higher
likelihood of disruption. In this section, we survey some
promising techniques that could potentially help the dynamics
of the game. All computer based systems can take advantage
of these techniques to improve their safety and security. In the
context of CPS, we discuss how each of these techniques can
improve security.
Machine Learning — Artificial Intelligence (AI) by means of
the subfields of Machine Learning (ML) and search provides
a large set of techniques appropriate for resilient cyber-
physical systems. There are three main ML paradigms, namely,
supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement. In supervised
machine learning, there are old and new data points. Old
data points are labelled. A label represents a classification of
data points. Comparing their similarity with old data points,
supervised machine learning assigns classes or labels to new
data points. With unsupervised ML, the data points are unla-
belled (i.e., learning is about extracting information from data).
Data points are grouped together into classes according to
similarity. The classes need to be labelled by a human expert.
In contrast, reinforcement learning rewards or penalizes the
learner following the validity of inferred classifications, i.e.,
there is no need for labelled data. Learning is inferred from
the successes and failures.
Supervised and reinforcement ML is used for system
identification and model fitting. Different alternative learning
methods exist, based on different considerations on the type
of the model (e.g., rule-based, support-vector machines, deep
learning models) and its properties (e.g., explainable mod-
els/decisions, efficiency).
Resilience plans build upon rational responses. Their per-
formance often requires rapid completion of search tasks.
Their efficiency can be greatly improved when the search are
informed, i.e., when it applies heuristics. The AI subfield of
search provides us with algorithms and methods for complex
decision making problems. For example, systems based on
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Monte Carlo tree search have been proven successful in
difficult games (e.g., AlphaGo and AlphaZero). Connection
between Monte Carlo tree search and reinforcement learning
exists in the AI literature [64], [71].
How does CPS security can take advantage of ML? The
start of an answer can be found in a book authored by Chio
and Freeman [14]. It is worth mentioning that the applicability
of ML to computer security has been demonstrated in the
past. The most successful story is the use of the approach
to control spam emails. Metadata, source reputation, user
feedback and pattern recognition have combined to filter out
junk emails. Furthermore, there is an evolution ability. The
filter gets better over time. ML is about data and, together
with clever algorithms, building experience such that next
time the system does better. This way of thinking is relevant
to CPS security because its defense can learn from attacks
and make the countermeasures evolve. Focussing on CPS-
specific threats, as an example pattern recognition can be used
to extract in data the characteristics of attacks and prevent
them in the future. Because of its ability to generalize, ML
can deal with adversaries hiding by varying the exact form
taken by their attack. Note that perpetrators can also adopt
the ML paradigm to learn defense strategies and evolve attack
methods. The full potential of ML for CPS security has not
been fully explored. The way is open for the application of
ML in several scenarios.
Fuzzy Decisional Systems — Fuzzy sets can be used to model
imprecision and vagueness. A concept is said imprecise when
several values satisfy it (e.g., the temperature is below zero). A
concept is vague when it represents partial truth. For example,
the fact that a temperature is near zero can be a matter of
degree and there is no value under which temperatures are near
zero and over which it is completely false that the temperatures
are near zero. Fuzzy systems are typically rule based systems
in which concepts are represented by means of fuzzy sets.
This permits that in particular situations, terms are partially
fulfilled and, as a consequence, rules are partially fired.
Fuzzy sets have been proven to be effective in modelling
safety and control. Fuzzy control being one of the most suc-
cessful application areas of fuzzy sets. In these applications,
a control system is defined by a set of fuzzy rules that will be
fired all at once. The set of consequents of all rules are then
combined taking into account the partial fulfillment of each
rule. Combination results into a fuzzy set that needs to be
defuzzified to result into an actual value. When the number of
variables in a system become large, the construction of fuzzy
sets systems need to deal with the course of dimensionality, as
the number of rules are typically exponential on the number of
variables. Hierarchical fuzzy systems have been developed to
deal with this problem. Adaptive systems exist that modify
the rules according to changes in the environment. Fuzzy
rules can be learned from data and, thus, used for adversarial
identification. Fuzzy rule based systems can be efficiently
deployed in real time systems. This is so because rules can
be fired in parallel and inference can be also implemented in
an efficient way. Fuzzy systems can also be used to model
high-level decision making processes, as e.g. to reason about
identification of adversarial actions, and the remediation to be
taken. These decisions need to take into account high doses
of uncertainty.
The potential of fuzzy decision making in computer sys-
tem security has been demonstrated. Its ability to deal with
uncertainty is particularly useful for risk assessment [2], [20].
Normal operation conditions of a CPS are a vague concept and
detection of abnormal conditions and unstable states can be
modelled and inferred using fuzzy systems where partial truth
is accommodated. Fuzzy systems are also useful for adaptive
control environments, in which the underlying models (e.g.,
system dynamics and related parameters) vary frequently, due
to the high degree of uncertainty in the system. All this needs
to be combined with probabilistic approaches as attacks are
either present or absent and thus better represented with prob-
abilistic approaches (i.e., attacks being related to intentionality
while failures and faults associated to uncertainty).
The Quantum Advantage — Quantum search techniques
are data size independent. Quantum ML, i.e., the use of
quantum computing for ML has potential because time com-
plexity of classification is independent of the number of data
points. Schuld and Killoran investigated the use of kernel
methods [62], that can be used for system identification, for
quantum machine learning. Encoding of classical data into
a quantum format is involved. A similar approach has been
proposed by Havlı´cˇek et al. [33]. Schuld and Petruccione [63]
discuss in details the application of quantum ML over classical
data generation and quantum data processing. A translation
procedure is required to map the classical data, i.e., the data
points, to quantum data, enabling quantum data processing,
i.e., quantum classification. However, there is a cost associated
with translating classical data into the quantum form, which
is comparable to the cost of classical ML classification. This
is right now the main barrier. The approach resulting in real
gains is quantum data generation and quantum data processing,
there is no need to translate from classical to quantum data.
Quantum data generation requires quantum sensing [16]. Suc-
cessful implementation of this approach will give the quantum
advantage, to the adversary or CPS defenders.
V. BENCHMARKING AND DIMENSIONING
In the previous section, we have seen the techniques to
enforce the defense learning approach. Hereafter, we talk about
the environment where the techniques can be put in place, as
well as to assure benchmarking and dimensioning of the new
approaches.
As introduced in Section I, a NCS puts together sensors,
controllers and actuators by means of shared communication
networks. Fixed wiring between these components is
therefore reduced, which results in reduced complexity, lower
overall cost and flexible architecture. The communication
network introduces challenges like varying delay of the
transmitted information and packet loss, which may have
a negative impact on the stability and performance of the
system. The usage of wireless communication networks in
wireless NCS further increases the impact of these problems
compared to traditional approaches like fieldbuses and
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Ethernet, as shown in [52], [59], [5]. For gaining insights
into root causes of performance properties of networked
systems, the ability to perform reproducible experiments
is important. A framework with tools and a concept for
testbed setup has been described in [25], with the plain
orchestrating system (pos) as a key component, supporting
the definition, execution, documentation, and evaluation of
experiments. This approach can be used to automatically set
up different network configurations and to perform a series
of experiments with varying parameter values according
to automatically generated specifications. A number of
publications, including [19], [18], are based on this approach
and the related tools for reproducible experiments, in
particular the flexible, high-performance load generator called
MoonGen [17], [21].
A suitable benchmark experimental setup is an inverted
pendulum, as it is an established reference in control theory
and robotics. Its dynamics are analyzed, e.g., in [11]. It
has been studied intensively in combination with wireless
NCS [23], [79], [56], [34], [74].
The load generator is software-based and uses the DPDK
software framework and off-the-shelf hardware, enabling high
packet rates and latency measurements with microsecond ac-
curacy and precision. This architecture offers more flexibility
than FPGA-based solutions. MoonGen uses specific features
of network cards to precisely reproduce various traffic patterns
and to measure latency with microsecond accuracy at speeds
of up to 100Gbit/s. The reproducible experiments profit from
extensive automation. They are thoroughly documented and
accurately replicable under equal or changed conditions. The
hardware equipment in the testbed includes different network
technologies (10GbE, 40GbE, and 100GbE), Netronome
SmartNICs, FPGA-based network cards (NetFPGA SUME),
and nodes with different multi-core CPUs, including a system
with a Tilera multi-core processor.
In [79], a NCS reference benchmark system is described,
realized as a two-wheeled inverted pendulum robot based on
the Lego Mindstorms platform. This platform allows measure-
ment of a NCS in different realistic network conditions. As
a baseline measurement, a wired network connection between
a controller and a robot is used, creating optimal operation
conditions with virtually no packet loss and predictable latency
in the range of microseconds. This ideal network connection is
compared to a wireless environment, involving packet loss and
higher delay. Ref. [79] provides a detailed analysis comparing
wired and wireless networks, under equal conditions, and
furthermore investigating latency, connection robustness and
energy consumption of the NCS. Instead of using real wireless
connectivity, a wireless channel emulator allows to perform
reproducible experiments, by replicating the properties of real
wireless channels in software. A wireless channel emulator can
either be used in combination of a physical artifact of a NCS,
or in combination with a software representation of a NCS,
e.g., implemented using an environment such as MATLAB.
MATLAB’s UDP socket module can be connected to such
a wireless channel emulator with variable delay, reordering
and adjustable packet loss probabilities, to investigate a NCS
subject to varying wireless channel behavior.
An automated, comprehensive measurement process allows
for observing the entire network stack and for analyzing
different variants of a NCS [23], [79], [22]. The data collected
on different layers of the network stack allows modeling the
observed behavior on each individual layer. An approach that
tightly integrates measurements and modeling allows to isolate
the effects of different components such as the application,
the operating system, or the network itself on the overall
control process. This allows to obtain valuable insights, and
applying a combined measurement / modeling approach to
improve robustness and security for future NCS.
The benchmarking methodology [23] combines the exper-
tise of the different domains control and network. This led
to the creation of an open-source benchmarking framework
with a Lego-based two-wheeled inverted pendulum provided
to the NCS research community. This affordable, easy-to-use
benchmarking framework is used to establish comprehensive
key performance indicators, applicable to a wide range of
different NCS. Documentation, manuals, and the software of
the so-called NCSbench framework, are freely available [8],
thereby supporting the cross-validation of results across differ-
ent research groups. So far, three robots were created by three
different research groups. A comparison of the achieved results
is available in [79]. The controller used in NCSbench is pre-
sented in detail in [56]. Efforts to analyze novel approaches for
NCS included live network monitoring and adaptive control,
analyzing the impact of essential controller properties, such
as the sampling time or the delay on the network connection
and the overall performance of the NCS, and how network
monitoring can be applied to NCS [22].
VI. CONCLUSION
A CPS is a physical process observed and controlled
through a computer network. Signals to actuators and feedback
from sensors are exchanged with a controller using a network.
The advantages of such an architecture are flexibility and
relatively low deployment cost. A CPS will always be prone
to failures and malicious attacks. The networking aspect of
CPS opens the door to cyber-physical attacks. Analysis of
past incidents highlights the advanced knowledge degree of the
adversaries perpetrating the attacks. Adversaries are smart and
they can learn. Their sophistication is such that they can fool
the controllers forging false feedback. Hence, a fundamental
CPS security problem is the feedback truthfulness.
The first burning question is the need to distinguish an
unintentional failure from a malicious attack. The signs result-
ing for these undesirable situations may be the same, but the
responses should be different. A fault can be repaired. Against,
an attack a CPS has to defend itself. Acknowledging that the
operation of a CPS may be disrupted by a malicious attack,
the second burning question is building a CPS with resilience.
That is, it must be able to recognize the presence of an attack,
recover and maintain operation. Several stories of attacks
and disruption told in the media (see Table I) are evidence
of the relevance of the problem and the increasing risks of
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major catastrophes in sectors such as industry, manufacturing,
transport or power generation. Currently, CPS are in principle
secure by design, in the sense that they implement state of the
art cryptography and protection techniques. In the future, they
need to be resilient by construction. We introduced the defense
learning paradigm where knowledge is built about adversaries,
their techniques are identified, weaknesses are discovered,
actions are anticipated and transformed into regular actions.
We have presented our vision on how next generation
resilient CPS will be. The same way that nobody can think
about current CPS without perfect safety to argue resilience;
we have claimed that in some years, nobody would think about
a CPS without perfect cyber-physical protection, in which the
adversarial paradigm would have to change and make sure that
an increase in the adversarial resources does not translate into
higher likelihood of CPS disruption. We have also listed some
promising techniques promoted by artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning (ML) communities, that may materialize
the new security stack addressing security beyond breach. We
believe AI/ML, search, fuzzy decision and quantum ML will
play roles in the design of CPS resilience.
The essence of the war between adversaries and defenders
is knowledge. On the one hand, supervised and reinforcement
learning can be used by an adversary for the purpose of system
identification, an enabler for covert attacks. On the other hand,
the design of resilience plans can leverage AI heuristic search
to speedup decision taking during the execution of a resilience
plan. The adaptive control that resilience requires may be
obtained using the fuzzy decisional approach. Quantum tech-
niques can eventually perform searches with time complexity
that is data size independent.
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